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Firm ownership, industrial structure and regional innovation 
performance in China’s provinces 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper uses panel data between 2000 and 2010 to explore how firm ownership and 
regional industrial structures contribute to regional innovation performance in Chinese 
provinces. Specifically, we explore how the extent of specialization and diversification in 
regional industrial structures at the province level foster both MAR and Jacobs spillovers, as 
well as how foreign and state ownership influence regional innovation. We find: (i) China’s 
regional innovation systems benefit from Jacobs but not MAR externalities, with the former 
spurring higher quality innovation in the form of increased invention patenting; (ii) state 
owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises  advance local innovation, with the latter 
again fostering higher quality innovation; (iii) a convergence towards the combination of low 
specialization and high diversity in provincial industry is taking place between China’s more 
developed inland coastal provinces and less developed inland provinces. Implications and 
suggestions for policy-making and future research are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Knowledge creation activities in regions are often geographically bounded due to the scope 
of knowledge spillovers and the tacit nature of knowledge transfer (Zucker et al., 2007; 
Döring and Schnellenbach, 2006). This geographic agglomeration of innovative activities 
differs between regions within national innovation systems (NIS), giving innovation systems 
a local character and highlighting the importance of the regional innovation system (RIS) 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Cooke, Uranga, & Etxebarria, 1997). The 
importance of the RIS has in turn sparked considerable debate on whether and how 
specialized or diversified regional industrial structures impact on regional innovation 
capabilities (Buerger & Cantner, 2011; Desrochers & Leppala, 2010; Farahmand, Akbari, & 
Abootalebi, 2012; Lee, Peng, & Song, 2013; Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992; 
Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2009). Spillovers, in their MAR and Jacobs forms, may be 
important to regional innovation, but as yet there is limited research on this question for 
China’s RIS, something we address here.  
Industrial enterprises are, of course, highly heterogeneous. Such things as ownership 
structures, firm-size, technological level, firm-age, and the like, also matter for innovation. A 
lot of the literature to date has focused primarily on the role of inward FDI and foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs) and their contribution to local innovation, including via spillovers 
(Ito et al., 2012; Fosfuri et al., 2001; Fu, 2008). Extant research has also focused on the role 
of specific industrial sectors as engines of RISs (Senker, 1996; Bell and Albu, 1999).Yet the 
role of domestic industrial enterprises, which are often owned by a variety of investors, 
including the state in the Chinese case,  may also play a significant role in facilitating local 
knowledge absorption and creation (Li, 2011). Although ownership concentration in listed 
firms and the extent to which this impacts economic returns and performance, for example, 
has been studied (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009; Florackis, Kostakis, & Ozkan, 2009; Rose, 
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2005), arguably our understanding of firm ownership affects regional innovation is still 
somewhat limited. 
This paper attempts to link up the two aforementioned strands of debate regarding 
geographic agglomeration, spillovers and firm ownership. We do so using a large, high 
quality, panel data which operationalizes the most accepted and widely used measures of 
regional industrial specialization and diversity, as well as several accepted measures of 
innovative output (invention, utility and design patent) that also capture qualitative aspects of 
innovation. As China is a developing country with a highly unbalanced economic structure, 
our goal is to also provide further insights into China’s RIS with a view to helping policy-
making and pointing directions for future research. China and other emerging economies with 
unbalanced economic structures are acutely aware of the potential ‘middle income trap’ and 
the great need to improve innovation in order to avoid becoming stuck in it (World Bank, 
2013). 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section builds our hypotheses, following 
which we explain data and methodology. Results are then reported followed by discussion 
and concluding comments. Our discussion also draws from our results to investigate the 
influences of industrial structure and ownership in the three most innovative regions in China 
(Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong) and two typical less developed (and less innovative) 
central regions (Hubei and Hunan, core members of the ‘Central Rise’ policy to develop 
inland-regions).  
 
2. Ownership and MAR/Jacobs externalities 
 
2.1 Foreign investment and regional innovation 
 
How and to what extent domestic host economy and domestic enterprises benefit from the 
presence of FIEs (via their FDI) has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Many 
developing countries have tried hard to attract FDI to help address their lack of domestic 
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capital and their comparatively weak technological bases (Ito et al., 2012; Sasidharan & 
Kathuria, 2011). First, FDI brings capital and new technology into the domestic market, 
which directly fuels domestic innovation and growth (Buckley, Wang, & Clegg, 2007). 
Second, the new products and services brought by FIEs also provides opportunities for 
domestic firms to improve their technological levels via learning and imitation (Potterie & 
Lichtenberg, 2001; Serapio & Dalton, 1999). Third, labor transfers from FIEs to local owned 
enterprises (LOEs) may enable the transfer of tacit knowledge as employees in FIEs are 
usually highly trained (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001). Finally, local firms can learn from FIEs 
through the creation of vertical linkages as suppliers to or customers of FIEs, as well as 
through competition with FIEs in both local and global markets (Fritsch and Franke, 2004; 
Liu et al., 2009). Generally, domestic enterprises can also indirectly reap benefits from FDI 
through several channels. There are numerous benefits, therefore, associated with inward 
foreign investment and the presence of foreign MNEs.  
 
H1: The presence of FIEs is positively related to a regions’ innovation capability.  
 
State-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises (SOEs) are arguably other important 
players that may, under certain conditions, also influence innovation in China (Li, 2009). 
SOEs are usually believed to be bureaucratic organizations carrying heavy social burdens that 
are comparatively inefficient (Lin et al., 1998; Raiser, 1997). China, however, has undergone 
a process of rapid economic transition to a market based economy. Most SOEs have been 
significantly restructured, upgraded and improved during the last three decades (Raiser, 1997; 
Jing and Tylecote, 2005). During this process, Chinese SOEs have been able to maintain 
important  relationships with central and local governments (Elfring & De Man, 1998), which 
have sometimes also provided them with special access to market and financial resources, 
which also help with the costs of innovating (Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). SOEs are 
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also much more likely to benefit from quasi monopoly market positions (Jefferson, Hu, Guan, 
& Yu, 2003) as the majority of Chinese SOEs are clustered in certain key sectors (e.g., oil 
and gas, telecommunications) that afford them such market power. 
Although studies have considered the relationship between state ownership and innovation 
(Li, 2009), the specific effects of SOEs on regional innovation and the systems of regional 
innovation have not yet garnered much attention. This is of interest because of the 
considerable heterogeneity in regional ownership structures and concentration. Some studies 
argue that SOEs are less innovative because they are excessively wed to the directions of 
state policy and also have low overall levels of efficiency (Lin et al., 1998; Raiser, 1997). 
SOEs also generally face less domestic market competition than other types of local 
enterprises making them reluctant to conduct R&D activities as they face less competitive 
pressure to do so (Raiser, 1997; Gao, 2004). On the other hand, some point out that, to the 
contrary, SOEs are now facing increasing challenges from FIEs and local private SMEs and 
as a result they in fact have strong incentives to invest in R&D (Girma et al., 2009; Li, 2011). 
Moreover, Chinese policy-makers are endeavoring to move from being a ‘world 
manufacturing factory’ to becoming a ‘global innovation centre’ (Williams, Graham, Jakobs, 
& Lyytinen, 2011). SOEs are hoping to play an essential role in implementing this strategy 
and their investment in R&D and S&T projects (also with universities and research 
institutions) have increased dramatically. Annual R&D expenditures in China’s largest state 
owned business groups, for example, grew by over 40% per annum between 1997 and 2008, 
far faster than other ownership classes (Big Business Group Yearbook, 2008). So SOEs may, 
after all, be conducive to local innovation in and the development of RISs.  
 
H2a: The presence of SOEs is positively related to a region’s innovation capability. 
This being said, there is now also a general widespread concern about the quality of 
Chinese innovation (OECD, 2008; World Bank, 2013). While a scramble to register patents 
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may be ongoing, an important consideration may also be the types of patents being registered 
and the actual extent of creative innovative activity embodied in these patents is also a 
concern. In particular, it has been suggested the innovative outputs of Chinese enterprise may 
not be comparable to their foreign counterparts, so leading to the ‘middle income trap’ 
problem, in which China remains unable to compete in low value added labor-intensive 
sectors, but also unable to move to the cutting edge technological frontier (World Bank, 
2013). As noted recently by the OECD, the capabilities for making productive use of the 
large accumulated investments in R&D, human resources for science and technology and 
related infrastructure, have developed much more slowly in the China’s indigenous state 
sector businesses (OECD, 2008). Thus considerable question marks have been raised about 
the qualitative nature of the innovation being undertaken in the state sector.  
 
H2b: The qualitative nature of SOE related innovation outputs is inferior to that of 
FIEs. 
 
 
2.2 Industrial externalities and local innovation 
 
A branch of theory explaining the dynamics of regional innovation relates to industrial 
structure and the types of externalities that are created through the propensity for 
agglomerations or clusters which foster the right type of environment for innovation. Indeed, 
the overall institutional and environmental conditions in which innovation takes place are 
considered vital for China’s long term innovative performance to improve (World Bank, 
2013). Dynamic externalities are considered to strongly influence long-run industrial growth 
in the recent literature on endogenous growth (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). There are 
two broad types of externalities of regional industrial development, Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
(MAR) externalities associated with specialization and Jacobs externalities associated with 
diversification. The MAR model claims that the concentration of an industry in a region 
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promotes knowledge spillovers between firms and facilitates innovation in that particular 
industry within that region (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). Jacobs (1969), by contrast, 
believed in diversity as the major engine for fruitful innovations, because "the greater the 
sheer number of and variety of division of labour, the greater the economy's inherent 
capacity for adding still more kinds of goods and services" (Jacobs, 1969, p. 59). Here  the 
most important sources of knowledge spillovers are external to the industry within which the 
firm operates (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). 
Studies supporting the MAR model emphasize knowledge transfer within the same or 
similar industries. Tacit or codified knowledge with lower transmission costs flows between 
actors within the same sector (Saxenian, 1994). This knowledge exchange is embedded 
within the labor mobility of skilled workers (Edler, Fier, & Grimpe, 2011), collaborative 
R&D activities (Gross, 2013; Liao and Yu, 2013) or even via enhanced communications 
(Storper and Venables, 2004). Second, industrial localization may lead to a less competitive, 
more monopolistic environment (Glaeser et al., 1992). These scholars believe that an insular 
environment protects innovation and that powerful companies within a local cluster can 
rearrange R&D resources more efficiently and pursue frontier technology more easily 
(Frenken, Oort, & Verburg, 2005; Mukkala, 2004). This argument has been supported by 
various cases in both developed countries and emerging market (Venables, 1996; Jaffe et al., 
1993; Sun and Liu, 2010). 
 
H3: Industrial specialization is positively related to a region’s innovation capability.  
 
 Supporters of the Jacobs model focus mainly on the interactive effect of communication 
between different industries, especially complementary sectors. Emerging technology fields 
benefit from a more diverse economy since they promote greater skill exchange between 
sectors (Harrison, Kelley, & Gant, 1996). Further opportunities to imitate, share and 
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recombine ideas and practices across industries are believed to be embedded within a more 
diverse regional economy (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009).  
 
H4a: Industrial diversity is positively related to a region’s innovation capability 
 
Both specialization and diversification may both have advantages, depending upon ones 
viewpoint. At a conceptual level the question of which spillovers may be more powerful 
remains unresolved. As such it becomes an empirical question as to which type of externality 
exerts the more positive influence. In general, the majority of empirical studies do find 
positive empirical evidence for both Jacobs and MAR spillovers, with many studies finding 
their simultaneous presence (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). A recent meta-analysis of 
existing studies, however, found that the positive effects of inter-industry type Jacobs’ 
spillovers were stronger than intra-industry type MAR spillovers (de Groot et al. 2009).  
 
H4b:  Industrial diversity in a region is more strongly associated with improved 
innovation capability than industrial specialization. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
We use multivariate regression analysis using panel data (2000-2010) of China’s 30 
provinces to further explore the hypotheses. Province level business ownership data is taken 
from the China Statistic Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS)). The China 
Statistic Yearbook on High Technology Industry (NBS and National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)) is also used 
and data for calculating dynamic externalities via regional industrial specialization and 
diversity is collected from the China Statistic Yearbook of Industrial and Economy (NBS).
1
  
 
3.1 Variable measurement 
 
                                           
1 Data collected from the NBS includes enterprises with gross output value exceeding 5 million RMB.  Formatted: Font: 10 pt
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Empirical papers favor patent count data as a legitimate source of reliable quality data 
capturing innovation output and local knowledge creation (Jaffe et al., 1993; Acs et al., 2002; 
von Wartburg et al., 2005; Cheung and Lin, 2004). Existing literature adopts patent count 
number in several ways, for example: by the amount of patent applications; number of 
granted patents; or patent forward citations as indicator for innovation output. Directly using 
patent applications and grants, however, suffers from several shortcomings. First, patent 
applications numbers in the yearbooks exaggerate the local innovation output as not every 
patent application will be approved. Second, due to the varying approval time required for 
patents according to the specific type, using numbers of granted patents in each year might 
create time lag biases. To overcome these problems, we use the granted patent count in the 
application year to measure regional innovation performance, collected manually from the 
SIPO website. Regional innovation capability is often measured by regional patent 
applications as intermediate innovative outputs (Fu, 2008; Liu and White, 1997; Usai, 2011; 
Wang and Zhou, 2013). Patent application count accurately represents innovation capability 
of individual regions as the same patent application standards and procedures are applied 
across regions (Huang et al., 2012; Li, 2011; Usai, 2011). Following Paci and Usai (1999), Fu 
(2008) and Huang et al. (2012), we use the number of total domestic patent applications per 
10,000 inhabitants as the primary dependent variable, which reduces the heterogeneity of 
territorial units. 
Further, to explore differences in the qualitative nature of innovative activity we also 
further decompose our total patent count measure to invention, design and utility sub-
categories (see, for example, Table 4Table 4). Patents registered in SIPO can be classified into 
these three categories. The consensus of existing literature regards invention and utility 
model patents to encompass more novel knowledge or knowledge with greater economic 
potential than external design patents (Albuquerque, 2000; Motohashi, 2008; Li, 2012). By 
Formatted: Font: 11 pt
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running separate regressions for each type of patent we can further ascertain insights into the 
qualitative impact of industrial structure and ownership on innovation (Table 4Table 4).  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables: capturing MAR and Jacobs externalities and FIEs and SOEs 
 
There are no agreed upon proxies for MAR and Jacobs’ externalities and it is generally 
agreed use of different proxies can be problematic for reaching a consensus regarding the 
impact of these externalities in the empirical literature (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). 
Nonetheless, we develop what we believe are comprehensive and accurate proxies of 
diversity and specialization that overcomes some of the empirical challenges. The first of 
these involves the level of aggregation at which industrial specialization and diversification 
are measured (ranging from 1 to the far finer 6 digit breakdown). It has been found that ‘the 
probability to detect Jacobs externalities increases with the level of detail of industry 
classification’ (it does not, however, have such tendency for MAR externalities) (Beaudry 
and Schiffauerova, 2009: 323). Our data adopts that level most commonly used in other 
studies, namely the 2-digit classification (Chinese Industrial Classification GB/T 4754 一
2002).  
The second of these involves the measures of specialization and diversification. We also 
use the most commonly used proxies in other studies. To proxy conditions for possible MAR 
externalities we take local industrial specialization as a measure of the local concentration of 
an industry at the beginning of the sample period. The formula we use is: 
.
. ..
( ) / ( )
ij j
ij
i
y y
S
y y
                                                   (1) 
 
where ijy  is gross industrial output value in industry j  in region i , .iy  is the total industrial 
output in region i , . jy  is the national industrial output in industry j , and ..y is the total 
national industrial output. Hence, ijS  measures industry j 's share of output in region i  
Formatted: Font: 11 pt
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relative to that in the entire country. A higher measure of ijS  indicates that region i  is more 
specialized in industry j  (Gao, 2004). Due to the availability of data at hand, we calculated 
industrial specialization indicators for 27 industries 
2
 (for details, see Table 4a and Table 5a 
in appendix).   
According to Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009), 35 of 67 studies use a ‘share’ measure as 
their measure of specialisation, where: ‘Share represents indicators based on the relative sizes 
of the industry, where the proportion a particular industry within the same or other industries 
in the country, region, and so on, are calculated’ (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009: 322). By 
comparison, the second most popular measure (employment related) was used in 17 studies. 
For Jacobs’ externatlities we employed the concept of diversity to mirror the extent to 
which local industrial structure was diversified. Let .( )ij ij iy y   be industry j ’s share of 
industry in region i . Then a Hirschman-Herfindahl index can be used as a measure of local 
industrial diversity. 
2
ij ik
k j
D 

                                                (2) 
 
The bigger of ijD , the less level of diversity of local industrial structure in the region. This 
definition follows (Henderson, 1997; Gao, 2004). In order to make the measure of diversity 
has positive monotonicity, we minus ijD  from 1. That is  
21ij ik
k j
d 

                                                 (3) 
 
Therefore, the higher of ijd , the more diversified of local industrial structure. Since 
diversity is a regional level indicator, we adopted the average of specializations of all local 
industries to display overall specialization of industrial structure at regional level. 
                                           
2 The number of local industries changed from 2000 to 2008 due to the modification of industrial catalog made by NBS. 
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
                                                (4) 
 
where n  is the amount of local industries. 
It has been found that 38 of 67 studies measuring Jacobs externalities also used HHI to 
measure diversification, making it by far the most commonly used measure (Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova, 2009: 323). By comparison, the second most popular measure (employment in 
innovative and non-innovative firms) was used in only 10 studies. 
Finally, to test the relationship between FIEs and regional innovation capability, we 
employ the proportion of total industrial output value contributed by local FIEs in a region to 
measure the presence of enterprises with foreign ownership, following Buckley et al. (2002) 
and Tian (2006). To test the relationship between SOEs and regional innovation capability, 
we employ the proportion of total industrial output value contributed by local SOEs in a 
region to measure the presence of SOEs, following (Gao, 2004).  
3.3 Control variables 
We also control for a number of factors that might influence regional innovative activity. 
The definitions, operationalization and data source for each variable are summarized in Table 
1Table 1. Regions with higher levels of R&D expenditures are more likely to innovate, as 
R&D investment (capital) creates new products and production process (Griliches, 1992; 
Jaffe et al., 1993; Usai, 2011; Wang, 2010). We therefore control for regional R&D intensity 
(RDI), which is the ratio of regional R&D expenditure over GDP. 
The availability of human capital (HRC) particularly the skilled labor force, is another 
important influence on regional innovation as regional human capital represents the 
capability to absorb and recognize external knowledge (Fu, 2008; Mankiw et al., 1992; Wang, 
2010). We thus control for (HRC), which is calculated as the ratio of residents with tertiary 
degrees divided by regional total inhabitants. Moreover, regional scale can have an effect on 
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
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innovative output as increasing returns to scale yield externalities (Feldman and Audretsch, 
1999). To account for such impacts, we use the natural logarithm of the number of total 
employees (EMP) in a region as a proxy for the economic size of the regions.  
We also expect that R&D activities thrive in regions with high rates of economic and 
industrial growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). These regions attract more foreign 
and domestic investment for innovation and grow faster (Fu et al., 2011). We use regional 
GDP growth rate (GDP) as a proxy to control for the effect of regional economic growth 
potential across regions and sectors (Cheung and Lin, 2004).  
As knowledge spillovers take time to be absorbed and affect a region’s innovation 
capability, we use a one year lag for all independent variables in our regression estimations. 
The underlying assumption is that patents are a result of a lengthy innovative process. 
Another advantage of lagging all independent variables by a year is that this procedure can 
remove possible endogeneity (Fu, 2008; Usai, 2011).  
Table 1 Definition and descriptions of variables 
Variable name Acronym Operationalization 
1. Regional patent count PATit Natural logarithm of patent applications/10000 
inhabitants of region i in year t-1 
2. Research intensity RDIi,t-1 Natural logarithm of R&D expenditure/GDP of 
region i in year t-1 
3. Human capital HRCi,t-1 Natural logarithm of the proportion of local 
residents with a tertiary degree of region i in year t-
1 
4. GDP growth rate GDPi,t-1 Natural logarithm of GDP growth rate of region i in 
year t-1 
5. Employment EMPi,t-1 Natural logarithm of number of employees of 
region i in year t-1 
6. Foreign invested enterprises FIEi,t-1 Natural logarithm of the proportion of the output of 
FIEs against total output of region i in year t-11 
7. State owned enterprises SOEi,t-1 Natural logarithm of the proportion of the output of 
SOEs against total output of region i in year t-11 
8.Specialization SPEi,t-1 Natural logarithm of Formula (4) in year t-1 
9.Diversity DIVi,t-1 Natural logarithm of Formula (3) in year t-1 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 
and Chinese Statistiacl Yearbook in various years. 
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3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Following prior studies (Cheung and Lin, 2004; Fu, 2008), the Lagrange Multiplier and 
Hausman tests are adopted to determine the choice between a random- and fixed-effects 
models. The results of the Hausman test are significant, indicating that it is appropriate to 
adopt a fixed-effects model for our estimations.  
The mean, standard deviation, and correlations of all variables show most of the 
independent variable correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.40. The highest correlation 
value of 0.58 is between regional human capital and R&D intensity and we further compute 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to ensure the results will not be affected by multicollinearity. 
VIF values for each independent variable are shown (bottom line of Table 2Table 2). The 
largest VIF values is 2.65 that is much smaller than the threshold of 10 (Belsley, 1980). We 
include the average value of VIF for each estimation, all of which are smaller than 2.1. 
Multicollinearity is therefore not a serious concern. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. PATit 1.00         
2. RDIi,t-1 0.73* 1.00        
3. HRCi,t-1 0.71* 0.58* 1.00       
4. GDPi,t-1 0.45* 0.31* 0.25* 1.00      
5. EMPi,t-1 0.09 0.12 -0.30* -0.01 1.00     
6. FIEi,t-1 0.71* 0.48* 0.42* 0.36* 0.12 1.00    
7. SOEi,t-1 0.02 0.25* 0.30* 0.00 -0.40* -0.38* 1.00   
8. SPEi,t-1 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 1.00  
9. DIVi,t-1 0.14* 0.07 0.14 0.27* 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.08 1.00 
Mean 6.05 1.14 7.36 12.38 2200.32 26.69 48.15 1.04 0.98 
S.D. 0.23 0.97 5.07 2.35 1504.17 23.83 17.40 0.41 0.21 
VIF  2.65 2.64 2.44 2.37 1.77 1.16 1.12 1.07 
Note: The panel consists of 30 regions for 10 years (2001-2010). 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 3Table 3 provides the regression results of all models using domestic patent applications 
per 10,000 inhabitants as the dependent variable (with fixed effects). All estimates are 
Comment [LN1]: Jian: can you 
add the value of the test here? just 
the value and the significant.  All 
tables below needs to be placed to 
the back and use “insert here” 
Formatted: Font: 11 pt
15 
 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by 
regions.  The F tests are all significant. 
 
Table 3 Panel regression using all patent applications as dependent variable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4 
RDIi,t-1  
0.927*** 
(0.288) 
0.556* 
(0.288) 
0.796** 
(0.301) 
0.469 
(0.312) 
HRCi,t-1  
0.983*** 
(0.255) 
0.804*** 
(0.222) 
0.887*** 
(0.216) 
0.707*** 
(0.191) 
GDPi,t-1  
0.608** 
(0.240) 
0.353* 
(0.188) 
0.705** 
(0.257) 
0.418* 
(0.218) 
EMPi,t-1  
0.182*** 
(0.064) 
0.283*** 
(0.071) 
0.174** 
(0.064) 
0.246*** 
(0.066) 
SOEi,t-1   
0.998*** 
(0.325) 
 
1.055*** 
(0.324) 
FIEi,t-1   
0.469*** 
(0.145) 
 
0.424** 
(0.179) 
SPEi,t-1   
 0.068*** 
(0.014) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
DIVi,t-1   
 0.471* 
(0.262) 
0.548** 
(0.266) 
Constant 
 
-3.794*** 
(0.904) 
-8.754*** 
(1.685) 
-3.787*** 
(0.842) 
-8.538*** 
(1.588) 
R
2
  0.5616 0.6122 0.5863 0.6301 
F test  50.10*** 44.30*** 31.89*** 32.65*** 
Observation  300 300 300 300 
VIF  1.63 2.11 1.47 1.90 
Notes: Regional patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by regions reported in parentheses. 
 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the results using a one-year lag between all independent 
variables and regional innovation capability in terms of patenting per 10,000 inhabitants 
(Table 3Table 3). As the base model for estimating, the first model includes control variables, 
the second and third model include the effects of different industrial ownerships and 
industrial structures associated with spillovers, respectively. All explanatory variables are 
introduced in model 4.  
In hypothesis 1 and 2a, we hypothesized that FIEs and SOEs are two contributors to 
regional innovation. Model 4 shows that the effect of SOEs is positive with a significance at 
Formatted: Font: 11 pt
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0.01 level (β=1.055, p<0.01, model 4) and the effect of FIEs is also statistically positive on 
regional patenting per 10,000 inhabitants (β=0.424, p<0.01, model 4). Meanwhile, in 
hypothesis 3 and 4a, we hypothesized that industrial specialization and diversity have 
positive externalities on regional innovativeness. Table 3Table 3 illustrates that industrial 
specialization is positively related to regional innovativeness but the effect is not statistically 
significant (β=0.027, p>0.1, model 4). By contrast, the effect of industrial diversity is 
positive on regional patenting and also statistically significant (β=0.548, p<0.01, model 4). 
Therefore, hypothesis 4a is supported but 3 is not. 
As  noted,  considering that invention and utility model patents are generally considered to 
embody more novel knowledge than external design patents, we further examine these 
measures of innovativeness as our dependent variable (again using  patents per 10,000 
inhabitants) (Table 4Table 4) to explore hypotheses 2b and 4b, which consider the qualitative 
nature of regional innovation. Models 14, 15 and 16 in Table 4Table 4 illustrate that the effect 
of SOE concentration on all three types of regional patenting is positive and statistically 
significant. The effect of SOEs on external design patenting, however, is much larger than on 
invention and utility models patenting. This indicates that SOEs have a comparative focus on 
innovation that embodies less novel knowledge.  The effect of local FIEs on all three types of 
patenting is also statistically positive but the effect is comparatively far stronger for invention 
and design patents rather than utility models. This partially supports hypothesis 2b. 
Turning again to MAR and Jacobs spillovers and their qualitative nature, we find a 
statistically significant positive effect for specialization (i.e. MAR spillovers) on utility 
models (β=0.043, p<0.05, model 15) but not on invention and external design patents. The 
effect of industrial diversity (i.e. Jacobs spillovers), by contrast, is statistically positive on 
both invention (β=0.527, p<0.4, model 14) and utility models patenting (β=0.505, p<0.1, 
model 15). This result is in line with some prior studies that show specialization is conducive 
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to incremental innovations while diversity is a facilitator for more radical innovations 
(Frenkin et al. 2005). These results therefore also support the view of the earlier finding that 
diversification, possibly via the creation of Jacobs type externalities, is a more important 
driver of Chinese regional innovation than specialization (and MAR type externalities).  
 
18 
 
Table 4.  Panel regression using three types of patent applications as dependent variable 
 
Model 5 
(invention) 
Model 6 
(utility) 
Model 7 
(design) 
Model 8 
(invention) 
Model 9 
(utility) 
Model 10 
(design) 
Model 11 
(invention) 
Model 12 
(utility) 
Model 13 
(design) 
Model 14 
(invention) 
Model 15 
(utility) 
Model 16 
(design) 
RDIi,t-1 1.294*** 
(0.297) 
0.940*** 
(0.244) 
0.582 
(0.376) 
0.914*** 
(0.311) 
0.678** 
(0.253) 
0.076 
(0.349) 
1.162*** 
(0.311) 
0.815*** 
(0.252) 
0.488 
(0.404) 
0.832** 
(0.344) 
0.603** 
(0.274) 
0.017 
(0.375) 
HRCi,t-1 1.049*** 
(0.262) 
0.914*** 
(0.220) 
1.014*** 
(0.341) 
0.871*** 
(0.235) 
0.784*** 
(0.205) 
0.762** 
(0.286) 
0.955*** 
(0.225) 
0.822*** 
(0.197) 
0.959*** 
(0.299) 
0.632** 
(0.260) 
0.699*** 
(0.192) 
0.696** 
(0.253) 
GDPi,t-1 0.819*** 
(0.261) 
0.344* 
(0.198) 
0.889** 
(0.341) 
0.564** 
(0.231) 
0.161 
(0.168) 
0.534** 
(0.250) 
0.922*** 
(0.275) 
0.439** 
(0.213) 
0.977** 
(0.364) 
0.632** 
(0.260) 
0.253 
(0.196) 
0.565* 
(0.282) 
EMPi,t-1 0.244*** 
(0.074) 
0.277*** 
(0.057) 
-0.044 
(0.090) 
0.336*** 
(0.070) 
0.355*** 
(0.065) 
0.108 
(0.102) 
0.241*** 
(0.075) 
0.271*** 
(0.060) 
-0.030 
(0.089) 
0.301*** 
(0.069) 
0.330*** 
(0.064) 
0.080 
(0.097) 
SOEi,t-1 
   
0.839** 
(0.365) 
0.808*** 
(0.280) 
1.575*** 
(0.460) 
   
0.893** 
(0.371) 
0.856*** 
(0.273) 
1.615*** 
(0.466) 
FIEi,t-1 
   
0.502*** 
(0.169) 
0.318** 
(0.128) 
0.615*** 
(0.178) 
   
0.454** 
(0.200) 
0.249* 
(0.143) 
0.596** 
(0.239) 
SPEi,t-1 
      
0.073*** 
(0.014) 
0.067*** 
(0.012) 
0.068*** 
(0.024) 
0.029 
(0.024) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.042) 
DIVi,t-1 
      
0.458* 
(0.268) 
0.446* 
(0.247) 
0.245 
(0.372) 
0.527* 
(0.301) 
0.505* 
(0.259) 
0.362 
(0.325) 
Constant -6.213*** 
(1.026) 
-4.588*** 
(0.784) 
-4.241*** 
(1.148) 
-10.595*** 
(1.767) 
-8.484*** 
(1.536) 
-11.824*** 
(2.210) 
-6.252*** 
(0.969) 
-4.595*** 
(0.761) 
-4.457*** 
(1.113) 
-10.394*** 
(1.642) 
-8.333*** 
(1.414) 
-11.66*** 
(2.170) 
R
2
 0.6549 0.5899 0.3568 0.6926 0.6226 0.4348 0.6749 0.6170 0.3682 0.7058 0.6444 0.4402 
F test 64.34*** 45.33*** 17.75*** 40.72*** 32.47*** 17.33*** 38.73*** 27.17*** 12.84*** 29.75*** 23.12*** 14.31*** 
Observation 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Notes: Regional patent applications per 10,000 inhabitants. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 
regions reported in parentheses. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our results suggest provincial industrial structures may influence the RIS in China, 
particularly via Jacobs’ spillovers and, in turn, Chinese innovation. Foreign 
investment and presence of SOEs also has an impact, with the former seemingly 
more important than the latter. What therefore is the regional balance (or 
imbalance) and overall nature of provincial industrial structures, including 
specialization, diversification and ownership, in China? Are levels of 
specialization and diversification highly heterogeneous and how have these been 
evolving? Are certain regions, as a result, more or less likely to benefit from these 
spillovers than others? 
To further explore these questions we now additionally consider some cross-
sectional snapshots from our provincial data-set that describe and compare the 
three most innovative regions in China (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong) with 
two typical less developed (and less innovative) central regions. We use Hubei 
and Hunan, core members of the ‘Central Rise’ policy to develop inland-regions 
implemented since 2006. Beijing and Shanghai are China’s political and financial 
centers, respectively. Guangdong pioneered the ‘Open door’ reforms implemented 
from 1980s (see these regions on a map of China in figure 1).  
They are highly innovative regions compares the amount of each type of patents 
filed in each region in this period. Beijing and Shanghai’s innovation growth have 
clearly been driven by invention patents ( 
 
Table 5Table 5) while in Guangdong, although the absolute volume of each type of 
patent is larger than the other two coastal regions, it is dominated by external design. 
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For the two central regions, utility models are more common than invention and 
design.  
 
 
 
Table 5 Increase rate and change of share of the three types of patent from 2000 to 2010 
Region 
 Increase rate (%)  Change of share (%) 
 Invention Utility Design  Invention Utility Design 
Beijing  922 355 167  23 -12 -11 
Shanghai  432 815 472  -8 11 -3 
Guangdong  2180 750 321  21 5 -26 
    743     
Hubei  846 560 743  6 -8 2 
Hunan  669 354 572  8 -33 25 
Source: Compiled by authors using collected data from SIPO website. 
 
 
5.1 MAR and Jacobs externalities and regional Chinese innovation 
 
How have levels of industrial specialization and diversification been evolving and are 
certain regions more likely to benefit from spillovers than others?  Table 6Table 6 
shows each of these regions, with the exception of Hubei, became more specialized 
between 2000 and 2008. As a whole the big three regions were specialized in 
technology intensive industries while the two central regions, by contrast, were 
specialized in labor or capital intensive industries. The impact of specialization on 
regional innovation, however, has earlier been shown to be limited (Table 3Table 3). 
More interesting then is the question of diversification and the potential for regional 
Jacobs’ spillovers.  
Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate regional trends in diversity and specialization. 
The circles represent the two central regions (Hubei and Hunan) and diamonds 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong. We set the level of specialization of 1.0 and the 
diversity of 0.85 as criteria so as to divide four segments within a matrix. Each 
segment captures different types of comparative industrial structure: low 
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specialization and low diversification (LSLD), low specialization and high 
diversification (LSHD), high specialization and low diversification (HSLD), high 
specialization and high diversification (HSHD). These segments illustrate the relative 
degree of specialization and diversity.  
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors using the aforementioned estimation data. 
Figure 2 Matrix of specialization and diversity of the five regions in 2000 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors using the aforementioned estimation data. 
Figure 3 Matrix of specialization and diversity of the five regions in 2008 
 
The figures show (also see Table 6Table 6) Beijing and Guangdong, in keeping with 
their status as innovative regions, appear to have become considerably more 
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diversified (increasing by 0.16 and 0.06 respectively) in terms of their industrial mix 
over this period. This potentially may have helped them reap additional Jacobs type 
spillover benefits, those we have also found to be associated with qualitatively 
superior innovation (i.e. invention and utility model patents). It is interesting to also 
note, however, that both Hubei and Hunan could potentially have, at least initially, 
also have benefitted from these to an even to a greater extent than their developed 
region counterparts (Table 6Table 6). While the levels of diversification in these 
central regions remained static, they are nonetheless high and exceed the levels seen 
in the coastal regions. This suggests that the impacts of these spillovers are likely only 
one of the elements determining innovation, and arguably minor. While considerable 
increases in diversification were witnessed in the coastal developed regions, it is 
arguably the far higher levels of FIE (and SOE) activities, with the potential for high 
value innovation, that have made the major impact on innovation. 
 
Table 6 Specialization and diversity of local industrial structure in the five regions 
Region 
 Specialization  Diversity 
 2000 2008  2000 2008 
Beijing  0.78 0.85  0.73 0.89 
Shanghai  0.89 0.95  0.89 0.90 
Guangdong  0.87 0.97  0.83 0.89 
       
Hubei  1.06 0.99  0.92 0.92 
Hunan  1.21 1.29  0.93 0.94 
Source: Compiled by authors using data collected from China Industry and Economy Statistic 
Yearbook. 
 
The arrows in Figure 2 indicate the direction of regional movement between 2000 
and 2008. They show Hunan remained stable in the area of HSHD while Hubei 
shifted from HSHD to LSHD. Beijing and Guangdong were located in LSLD initially 
in 2000. Beijing had considerably lower levels of specialization and diversification 
than Shanghai and Guangdong. However, during a decade of restructuring, both 
Formatted: Font: Times New
Roman, 12 pt
23 
 
Guangdong and Beijing edged into LSHD, and became more similar to Shanghai. 
Beijing’s transformation has been considerable: specialization and diversity increased 
0.07 and 0.16, respectively.  
The figures suggest that the degree of specialization and diversification therefore 
appear to be undergoing a convergence process. We further observe that LSHD has 
become the most common structure, with Beijing, Guangdong and Hubei moving into 
this quadrant during the sample period (and Shanghai is also there but has taken a 
small step towards greater specialization). Convergence towards a particular portfolio 
of industrial specialization and diversity at the regional level may be taking place in 
China (Huallacháin and Lee, 2011). 
As regards specialization, our overall results showed it to have no effect on 
innovation as measured by total (all kinds) of patents. At the level of different patent 
types, however, some did show increased patenting activity (i.e. utility models). 
Clearly, the inland regions appear to have higher levels of specialization (although 
these were also universally increasing in the coastal regions), so may potentially 
benefit from these. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the big three coastal 
regions were far more concentrated in technology intensive industries, such as 
electronics and telecommunications Equipment, instruments and meters and general 
Machinery’. By contrast, Hubei and Hunan were more specialized in areas such as 
tobacco processing and mining. Generally, the share of gross output of ‘high 
technology enterprises’ (HTEs) of the big three regions was around 20% during the 
sample period. It was much lower in Hubei and Hunan and the contribution to local 
innovation output made by local hi-tech industries was not significant in these two 
provinces (Prevezer et al., 2012). The coastal regions, by contrast, had become the 
R&D center of China. For example, the gross output and amount of patent 
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applications of electronics and telecommunications equipment in Guangdong 
accounted for 36% and 71%  respectively of total the total patent applications in the 
whole China (Prevezer, Li, & Panzarasa, 2012). HTEs have clustered in coastal 
regions in China (Hu et al., 2005; Zhou & Xin, 2003). As they are more likely to 
produce more innovative novel knowledge the share of inventions and utility models 
of the big-three regions indicates the potential linkage between HTEs and high quality 
R&D outputs.  By contrast, although levels of specialization may be generally higher 
and have also in some cases increased (i.e. Hunan), because the industries in which 
these inland provinces are specializing in have limited innovative potentiality, the 
impacts of increased specialization have been limited.  
To summarize, in general there has been a convergence process in play in 
provincial industrial structures. By 2008, for example, there were close similarities in 
levels of industrial diversification, according to our findings the more important 
source of spillovers (i.e. of the Jacobs type). This suggests other, more important 
factors, are driving the wide disparities in innovation performance across regions.  
5.2 Ownership: provincial disparities in FIEs and SOEs 
 
MAR and Jacobs spillovers, as mentioned, are of course only one of many factors 
affecting regional innovation. The developed regions of China also benefit 
enormously from foreign investment and a proliferation of large central SOE groups. 
There is considerable regional heterogeneity within China’s RIS regarding the 
contribution of SOEs and FIEs (Table 7Table 7). How different levels of SOEs and 
FIEs affect the innovative capacity of a region is therefore also an important question. 
Our earlier findings show that while SOEs do drive patenting activity, FIEs are 
arguably a still more important source. To what extent does the presence of FIEs and 
SOEs drive regional innovation performance in China?  
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Comparisons of the five regions point to considerable geographical differences and 
heterogeneity in the contributions of FIEs and SOEs.  Table 7Table 7 shows the 
deflated absolute value and shares of gross industrial output of SOEs, FIEs and 
collective-owned enterprises (COEs), limited liability enterprises (LLEs) and private 
enterprises (POEs).
 3
 
Table 7 Gross industrial output value and proportion of local industrial enterprises in the five regions 
Region 
 2000  2010 
 SOE FIE COE LLE  SOE FIE POE Others 
Beijing  1742.7
a
 
(0.54
b
) 
1150.3 
(0.36) 
175.3 
(0.05) 
164.0 
(0.05) 
 4853.3 
(0.53) 
3667.3 
(0.40) 
543.6 
(0.06) 
123.7 
(0.01) 
Shanghai  3205.1 
(0.43) 
3431.2 
(0.46) 
394.8 
(0.05) 
464.8 
(0.06) 
 7490.3 
(0.32) 
12321.1 
(0.53) 
2331.5 
(0.10) 
1014 
(0.04) 
Guangdong  3126.1 
(0.25) 
7274.4 
(0.59) 
1202.5 
(0.10) 
809.6 
(0.07) 
 8812.8 
(0.15) 
30468 
(0.53) 
10844.1 
(0.19) 
7321.3 
(0.13) 
           
Hubei  1929.0 
(0.57) 
336.3 
(0.10) 
564.5 
(0.17) 
545.8 
(0.16) 
 5769.2 
(0.40) 
2909.4 
(0.20) 
3859.6 
(0.27) 
1935.1 
(0.13) 
Hunan  1077.5 
(0.65) 
97.1 
(0.06) 
241.7 
(0.15) 
238.3 
(0.14) 
 3590.9 
(0.28) 
938.4 
(0.07) 
5492.7 
(0.43) 
2701.5 
(0.21) 
Note: 
a
 The unit of the output is 100 million RMB. 
b
 Figure in the parenthesis is the share of 
output in respective to the total output of a region. 
Source: Compiled by the authors using data collected from the National Bureau of Statistics, 
P.R.China, various years. 
 
The gross industrial output values of SOEs and FIEs in the big-three regions 
accounts for a very large proportion of the local industrial output (for instance, 90% in 
Beijing in 2000 increasing to 93% in 2010). In contrast, the contribution of SOEs and 
FIEs in the central regions was lower, decreasing from 67% to 60% and 71% to 35% 
in Hubei and Hunan, respectively. The position of SOEs and FIEs was by no means as 
important in these inland, less developed regions. FIEs in Shanghai and Guangdong 
were the biggest players, contributing over half of local industrial output in both 
periods. Beijing, by contrast, was more dependent on local SOEs, which accounted 
                                           
3 We deflated output values in 2010 to 2000 prices using deflators provided by World Bank dataset For 
details, refer to http://data.worldbank.org/country/china. 
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for 54% and 53% of local industrial output in 2000 and 2010, respectively. This 
clearly may also go some way to explaining the differing levels of invention, utility 
and design patents registered between the regions (Error! Reference source not 
found.Figure 2). 
Although SOEs in Hubei were also the largest contributors to industrial output, 
their share had declined from 57% to 40%, while the contribution of FIEs increased 
10%. Moreover, the industrial structure of Hunan was significantly reshaped during 
this period by small-scale private enterprises, not SOEs. FIEs accounted for less than 
10% of Hunan’s industrial output during the sample period. The industrial structures 
of Beijing and Hubei were therefore most driven by large SOEs, in Shanghai and 
Guangdong FIEs were most important, and Hunan was becoming dominated by 
private enterprises. From the perspective of the number of local industrial enterprises 
we can draw very similar conclusions: namely that FIEs clustered in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong whereas POEs grew rapidly in Hubei and Hunan during the 
period. Evidence using the number of employees shows similar patterns.  
SOEs and FIEs are the main contributors to regional economies. The proportion of 
these enterprises exceeds half of local gross industrial output value. For Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong, the role played by SOEs and FIEs was stable and important. 
Meanwhile, FIEs in Shanghai and Guangdong were more active than in other regions. 
POEs become the main contributor for local economy in Hunan in 2010. Considering 
that POEs usually do not have significant R&D expenditures and R&D personnel, 
their innovation strategies are more likely to focus on shorter term profitability, and 
their innovation outputs are also lower quality than SOEs and FIEs. This is why the 
share of utility model patents declined 33% while the share of external design patents 
increased 25% during 2000 to 2010. 
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All in all, iIn the debate on MAR and Jacobs externalities there has been 
considerable uncertainty on the impacts of each (Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2009). As 
Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009: 319) note: ‘the question as to which of the 
Marshall– Arrow–Romer (MAR) or Jacobs externalities is the most beneficial to 
growth or innovation is rather complex’. This is in part because it ‘depends on the 
way it is measured, where it is measured, on which industries, at which level of 
aggregation’ (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009: 319).  
To the best of our knowledge few studies have considered their potential impact on 
regional innovation in China. Here we find evidence to support the idea that China’s 
provinces may benefit from higher levels of industrial diversification. We also found 
that provinces with higher levels of foreign and state ownership performed better at 
innovation. Specifically, FIEs led to significantly more increase in invention patents, 
whereas SOEs contributed seemingly to lower value added innovations, albeit 
actively.   
It is difficult to precisely understand the relationship between industrial structure 
and regional innovation performance and the contribution of MAR and Jacobs 
externalities. This is in part because of the uncertainty about how to measure 
diversification and specialization, what scale of geographical unit of analysis to use 
and what dependent variables are most appropriate to measure innovation. Future 
studies can no doubt consider alternative levels of industrial disaggregation (i.e. 3, 4, 
5 or even 6 digit levels), different units of geographical analysis (i.e. probably smaller) 
and different dependent variable measurements to see if similar results are found. Our 
first attempt at this question for China, as noted, has tried to adopt an empirical stance 
that is closely informed by previous studies and thus one that creates results that may 
be broadly comparable. Future research might also try and undertake more detailed 
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case work to identify the microeconomic foundations of the intra and inter-industrial 
knowledge spillovers at work in the different regions of China. As Desrochers and 
Leppala (2011) note, these still remain something of an unopened ‘black box’, 
particularly in the case of a large and diverse emerging market like China.  
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Figure 1 Administrative divisions of People’s Republic of China (PRC) Comment [LN5]: Use our map 
from RS not from Wikipedia  
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Table 3 The top three specialized industries in the five regions in 2000 and 2008 
Region 
2000   2008 
 Production. SPE.   Production. SPE. 
Beijing 
Electronic and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
1199.03 2.90   Electronic and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
2378.29 2.58  
Oil and Refinement 115.44 1.68   Instrument & Meter 208.48 2.01  
Beverage Production 77.16 1.43   Electricity & Heat 1242.39 1.94  
  
Shanghai 
Transportation 
Equipment 
813.09 1.75   Electronic and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
5158.73 2.49  
Ferrous metal 450.27 1.53   General Machinery 2183.02 1.89  
Chemical Fibers 159.66 1.43   Transportation 
Equipment 
2552.21 1.61  
  
Guangdong 
Instrument & Meter 321.92 2.28   Electronic and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
14956.36 3.07  
Electronic and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
3490.78 2.06   Instrument & Meter 1316.22 2.41  
Electrical Machinery 
Equipment 
1368.12 1.67   Electrical Machinery 
Equipment 
6964.17 2.07  
  
Hubei 
Transportation 
Equipment 
451.77 2.24   Transportation 
Equipment 
2397.03 2.64  
Food Process 164.88 1.46   Nonmetal Minerals 
Mining & Dressing 
114.36 2.28  
Pharmaceutical 
Production 
114.16 1.40   Tobacco Processing 257.6 2.10  
  
Hunan 
Tobacco Processing 59.65 3.91   Tobacco Processing 412.86 4.00  
Nonferrous Metal 86.05 2.83   Nonmetal Minerals 
Mining & Dressing 
123.56 2.92  
Oil and Refinement 56.79 1.91   Nonferrous Metal 177.82 2.90  
Note: The unit for the production is 100 million RMB as 1990’s price. SPE.=specialization 
Source: Compiled by authors from China Industry and Economy Statistic Yearbook 
Comment [J6]: These two tables 
may not necessary to be included 
in the paper. 
Comment [LN7R6]: We can keep 
them 
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Table 4a The number and share of the three types patents in 2000 and 2010 
Region 
2000  2010 
Invention 
(%) 
Utility 
(%) 
Design 
(%) 
 
Invention 
(%) 
Utility 
(%) 
Design 
(%) 
Beijing 
3176 
(37) 
3778 
(44) 
1683 
(19) 
 
32471 
(60) 
17188 
(32) 
4490 
(8) 
Shanghai 
4406 
(49) 
2263 
25 
2373 
(26) 
 
23446 
(41) 
20699 
(36) 
13585 
(23) 
Guangdong 
1705 
(9) 
5025 
(27) 
11792 
(64) 
 
38789 
(30) 
42708 
(32) 
49622 
(38) 
Hubei 
699 
(26) 
1529 
(56) 
491 
(18) 
 
6613 
(32) 
10090 
(48) 
4137 
(20) 
Hunan 
707 
(23) 
1713 
(57) 
603 
(20) 
 
5434 
(31) 
7782 
(24) 
4053 
(45) 
Note: Figures in the parentheses show the total as a percentage of the full regional sample. 
Source: Compiled by authors by using data collected from the website of SIPO. 
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